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LIABILITY OF LANDOWNERS
Resultant From Their Employment of Independent Contractors
By ERRoL TyLE*
4IHE WHOLE WORLD," said Captain Boyle in O'Casey's Juno
and the Paycock, "is in a state of chaos." One is apt to have the same
thought when first meeting the law applicable to the liability of a
landowner for injuries resulting from his employment of an independ-
ent contractor. But the seeming chaos is susceptible to the imposition
of at least some semblance of order. It is the purpose of this comment
to so order the material as to present a general survey of the problems
which may be faced by the owner-employer; and, perhaps more im-
portantly, to sketch the various situations in which the injured plaintiff
may reach the more affluent owner. The situations being numerous,
this comment will therefore necessarily be general-limited to the out-
lines of the areas involved.
The General Rule
It is the general rule that a person who employs an independent
contractor to secure the performance of certain work, lawful in itself
and not inherently injurious to others, is not responsible for injuries
caused by the negligent acts of the contractor or his servants.' More
shortly, there is no vicarious liability imposed upon the employer of
an independent contractor. The reason most commonly accepted is
that "since the employer has no right of control over the manner in
which the work is to be done, it is to be regarded as the contractor's
own enterprise, and he, rather than the employer, is the proper party
to be charged with the responsibility of preventing the risk, and ad-
ministering and distributing it."2
Exceptions
This rule has been subjected- to many exceptions.a These excep-
tions embrace two classes of cases: (1) where the work contracted
*Member, Third Year class.
I Williams v. Fairhaven Cemetery Ass'n, 52 Cal. 2d 135, 338 P.2d 392 (1959);
Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 17 Cal. 2d 594, 110 P.2d 1044 (1941); Luce v. Hollo-
way, 156 Cal. 152, 103 Pac. 886 (1909); Louthan v. Hewes, 138 Cal. 116, 70 Pac. 1065
(1902); Hedge v. Williams, 131 Cal. 455, 63 Pac. 721, 64 Pac. 106 (1901); Frassi v.
McDonald, 122 Cal. 400, 55 Pac. 139, 772 (1898); Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469 (1857);
Bedford v. Bechtel Corp., 172 Cal. App. 2d 401, 342 P.2d 495 (1959); Sabin v. Union
Oil Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 606, 310 P.2d 685 (1957); PROSSER, ToRT-s 357 (2d ed. 1955);
RESTATEmErT, ToRTS § 409 (1934).
2 PnossER, ToRTs 357 (2d ed. 1955); similarly stated in Snyder v. So. Calif. Edison
Co., 44 Cal. 2d 793, 285 P.2d 912 (1955), citing with approval HAPER, TORTS § 292
(1933); Eli v. Murphy, 39 Cal. 2d 598, 247 P.2d 352 (1952).
3 Courtell v. McEachen, 51 Cal. 2d 448, 334 P.2d 870 (1959); Risley v. Lenwell,
129 Cal. App. 2d 608, 277 P.2d 897 (1954).
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for is inherently or intrinsically dangerous; and (2) where the em-
ployer owes a duty to the plaintiff which the law will not allow him
to delegate. 4 In these cases the employer is held liable for the negli-
gence of his contractor though he himself is free from negligence.
A non-delegable duty may be imposed by statute or ordinance, 5
by contract,6 by franchise or charter, 7 or by the courts. The basis for
holding a particular duty non-delegable is elusive-the holdings seem
to be based on grounds of policy, where the responsibility of the em-
ployer is so important to the community that he should not be per-
mitted to transfer it to another. 8 The inherent danger exception is
closely interwoven with the non-delegable duty exception, but never-
theless the two have been applied independently by many courts. The
former, however, has met with little favor in California in past years. 9
A fairly recent case10 gives some indication that it may be accepted,
and it has been alluded to in another,1 so it is not to be overlooked
completely. The exception rests on the belief that when danger and
peril inhere in the very nature of the work, justice requires that the
responsibility for injuries resulting from, or occasioned by, this peril
should not be allowed to be passed on to the contractor. 12 This situa-
tion is to be distinguished from that where the work contracted for is
such that its mere performance in the manner called for will result
in injury. In this case the liability of the employer is based on the
fact that the work is done at all, and he is the one who caused it to
be done.13
The ownership of the property on which the contractor is doing
the work is not sufficient in itself to charge the owner with liability
4 HARtPER, TORTs § 292 (1933), cited with approval in Snyder v. So. Calif. Edison
Co., 44 Cal. 2d 793, 285 P.2d 912 (1955).
5 Luce v. Holloway, 156 Cal. 162, 103 Pac. 886 (1909); Spence v. Shultz, 103 Cal.
208, 37 Pac. 220 (1894); Bedford v. Bechtel Corp., 172 Cal. App. 2d 401, 342 P.2d
495 (1959); Atherley v. MacDonald, Young & Nelson, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 575, 298
P.2d 700 (1956); Sawaya v. DeCou, 60 Cal. App. 2d 146, 140 P.2d 98 (1943).
6 Colgrove v. Smith, 102 Cal. 220, 36 Pac. 411 (1894).
7 Eli v. Murphy, 39 Cal. 2d 598, 248 P.2d 756 (1952); Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger
Co., 17 Cal. 2d 594, 110 P.2d 1044 (1941); Lehman v. Robertson Truck - A - Way, 122
Cal. App. 2d 82, 264 P.2d 653 (1953); Gilbert v. Rogers, 117 Cal. App. 2d 712, 256
P.2d 574 (1953).
8 PROSsER, TORTS 359 (2d ed. 1955).
9 Comment, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 762, 767 (1956).
10 Snyder v. So. Calif. Edison Co., 44 Cal. 2d 793, 285 P.2d 912 (1955), citing
with approval Harper's discussion of the inherent danger exception in HAmE, TORTS
§ 392 (1933). See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§416, 423 (1934).
11 Recognized but not applied in Gaskill v. Calaveras Cement Co., 102 Cal. App.
2d 120, 226 P.2d 633 (1951).
12 Schmidlin v. Alta Planing Mill Co., 170 Cal. 589, 150 Pac. 983 (1915).
'1 Williams v. Fresno Canal & Irr. Co., 96 Cal. 14, 30 Pac. 961 (1892); Aston v.
Nolan, 63 Cal. 269 (1883) overruled on other grounds by Sullivan v. Zeiner, 98 Cal.
346, 33 Pac. 209 (1893); Strodel v. Wilcox, 137 Cal. App. 2d 791, 291 P.2d 95 (1955);
Atkinson v. Charles Nelson Co., 41 Cal. App. 304, 182 Pac. 759 (1919).
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for acts of negligence otherwise chargeable to the contractor. 14 But
the owner-employer relationship does give rise to an expanded number
of situations in which the employer may be held liable. It is this wide
range of situations-not limited to those involving vicarious liability-
which will now be considered.
Non-Delegable Duties
To Invitees
The owner or possessor of land owes a duty to his invitees to exer-
cise reasonable care to prevent their being injured on the premises.15
He has a duty to warn them of dangers-natural or artificial-of which
they are not aware, and of which he knows, or as a reasonable prudent
man should know, unless the dangers are obvious to a person of ordi-
nary intelligence."6 Likewise, he has a duty to maintain the premises
in reasonably safe condition for his invitees. 17 These duties cannot be
delegated to an independent contractor.' 8 The duty of the owner or
possessor of land to exercise due care to protect his invitees from in-
jury includes the duty to exercise reasonably careful supervision over
the appliances or methods used by his independent contractor.' 9
The servant of an independent contractor is considered an invitee
of the owner-employer while he is on the premises engaged in the
work contracted for,20 and is deemed to be there at the owner's in-
vitation-either express or implied.21 The owner's duty to the em-
ployee of the contractor extends to that portion of the premises over
24Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469 (1857); Hickey v. Nulty, 182 Cal. App. 2d 237,
5 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1960); Gardner v. Stonestown Corp., 145 Cal. App. 2d 405, 302 P.2d
674 (1956).
'5 Smith v. Kern County Land Co., 51 Cal. 2d 205, 331 P.2d 645 (1958); Edwards
v. Hollywood Canteen, 27 Cal. 2d 802, 167 P.2d 729 (1946); Oettinger v. Stewart, 24
Cal. 2d 133, 148 P.2d 19 (1944); Mautino v. Sutter Hospital Ass'n, 211 Cal. 556, 296
Pac. 76 (1931); PRossER, ToRTs 453 (2d ed. 1955). See RESTATEm NT, TORTS § 343
(1934).
:
6 Dingman v. Mattock Co., 15 Cal. 2d 622, 104 P.2d 26 (1940); Alvarado v. An-
derson, 175 Cal. App. 2d 166, 346 P.2d 73 (1959); Curland v. Los Angeles County
Fair Ass'n, 118 Cal. App. 2d 691, 258 P.2d 1063 (1953).
"7 Alvarado v. Anderson, 175 Cal. App. 2d 166, 346 P.2d 73 (1959); Oldenburg
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 152 Cal. App. 2d 733, 314 P.2d 33 (1957); Powell v. Vracin,
150 Cal. App. 2d 454, 310 P.2d 27 (1957).
1 8 Brown v. George Pepperdine Foundation, 23 Cal. 2d 256, 143 P.2d 929 (1943);
Raich v. Aldon Const. Co., 129 Cal. App. 2d 278, 276 P.2d 822 (1954); Bazzoli v.
Nance's Sanitarium, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 2d 232, 240 P.2d 672 (1952); Dobbie v. Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co., 95 Cal. App. 781, 273 Pac. 630 (1928).
10 McCordic v. Crawford, 23 Cal. 2d 1, 142 P.2d 7 (1943); Basye v. Craft's Golden
State Shows, 43 Cal. App. 2d 782, 111 P.2d 746 (1941). See RESTATEmENT, TORTS
§ 344 (1934).
20 Dobbie v. Pacific Gas & EIec. Co., 95 Cal. App. 781, 273 Pac. 630 (1928).
2126 CAL. Jun. 2d, Independent Contractors, § 24 (1956).
Aug., 1961] COMMENTS
which the owner remains in control, 22 but not to that portion over
which the contractor retains control.23 Even if the owner is aware
that the contractor is performing the work negligently and is endan-
gering the employees, no duty on the owner's part is created toward
the employees;24 for although the employee is considered an invitee,
the owner's duty toward him is more limited than that owed to other
invitees. The duty owed the employee may not be delegated to the
contractor.2 5 Nor is the contractor's knowledge of the danger imput-
able to his employees. 26
Trespassers and Licensees
The law imposes no duty on the owner or possessor of property
to maintain his premises in such a condition that they will be safe for
one trespassing thereon,27 or for one present as a licensee.28  But if
the presence of the trespasser is discovered,29 or if the owner knows
that they frequently invade a particular area,3 0 then they are owed
a duty to exercise reasonable care as to any active operations carried
on upon the premises.31 This duty is not altered by the fact that the
trespasser is a child,3 2 except in cases that fall within the attractive
nuisance doctrine.33
2 2 Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Co., 44 Cal. 2d 225, 282 P.2d 697 (1955);
Bedford v. Bechtel Corp., 172 Cal. App. 2d 401, 342 P.2d 495 (1959); Brown v. Board
of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 41 Cal. App. 100, 182 Pac. 316 (1919).
23 See note 22 supra.
24Bedford v. Bechtel Corp., 172 Cal. App. 2d 401, 342 P.2d 495 (1959).
25 See note 18 supra.
26 Dobbie v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 95 Cal. App. 781, 273 Pac. 630 (1928).
27 Toomey v. Southern Pac. Co., 86 Cal. 374, 24 Pac. 1074 (1890); Hickey v.
Nulty, 182 Cal. App. 2d 237, 5 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1960); Hume v. Hart, 109 Cal. App.
2d 614, 241 P.2d 25 (1952); PROSSER, TORTS 433 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§333 (1934).
28 Hession v. San Francisco, 122 Cal. App. 2d 592, 265 P.2d 542 (1954); PRossE,
ToRTs 445 (2d ed. 1955).
29 Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 219 P.2d 73
(1950); Parrott v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 425 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
30 Fernandez v. American Bridge Co., 104 Cal. App 2d 340, 231 P.2d 548 (1951);
PRossER, ToRTs 437 (2d ed. 1955).
31 Radoff v. Hunter, 158 Cal. App. 2d 770, 323 P.2d 202 (1958); Northon v.
Schultz, 130 Cal. App. 2d 488, 279 P.2d 103 (1955); Hagen v. Laursen, 121 Cal. App.
2d 379, 263 P.2d 489 (1953); Tesone v. Reiman, 117 Cal. App. 2d 211, 255 P.2d 48
(1953); Davis v. Silverwood, 116 Cal. App. 2d 39, 253 P.2d 83 (1953); Church v.
Headrick & Brown, 101 Cal. App. 2d 396, 225 P.2d 558 (1950); Fernandez v. Consoli-
dated Fisheries, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 219 P.2d 73 (1950). See RESTATEmENT,
TORTS §§ 334-38 (1934).
32 Giannini v. Campodonico, 176 Cal. 548, 169 Pac. 80 (1917) distinguished on
another point in Oettinger v. Stewart, 244 Cal. 2d 133, 148 P.2d 19 (1944); Peters v.
Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 47 Pac. 113, 598 (1896); Puchta v. Rothman, 99 Cal. App. 2d
285, 221 P.2d 744 (1950).
s3 Lake v. Ferrer, 139 Cal. App. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 104 (1956). See Prosser, Tres-
passing Children, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 427 (1959).
[Vol. 13THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Licensees are also owed a duty to use reasonable care in carrying
on active operations on the premises.3 4 As the licensee has the owner's
consent to come on the premises, the owner may be required to exer-
cise reasonable care to discover his presence. 35 In addition, reasonable
care must be exercised to warn the licensee of any concealed dan-
gerous conditions known to the owner. 0
Although the question has apparently not yet been decided in
California, it is likely that the duties owed trespassers and licensees
would be considered non-delegable. As far as they go, they are of
essentially the same nature as those owed an invitee. If the owner
employs an independent contractor to conduct active operations on
a part of the premises over which the owner knows trespassers fre-
quently pass, and he knows, or should know,37 of a risk of injury to
them, he should not be permitted to delegate to the contractor his
duty to warn them or to take other proper precautions to safeguard
them from injury. The same should apply to the duty owed the licen-
see, including the possible duty to use reasonable care to discover
his presence.
Duty to Maintain and Repair
The owner or possessor of land is charged with a non-delegable
duty to place and maintain structures thereon in a reasonably safe
condition,3 8 and is liable for the negligent failure of his contractor to
do so.c9 The owner of property cannot escape liability for dangerous
conditions on his property by having an independent contractor as-
sume the duty of constructing or repairing a building or chattel.4 0 It
should be noted that this duty to maintain and repair is closely related
to the duty owed invitees, licensees, and trespassers. Its application,
s' Simpson v. Richmond, 154 Cal. App. .2d 27, 315 P.2d 435 (1957); Boucher v.
American Bridge Co., 95 Cal. App. 2d 659, 213 P.2d 537 (1950); Oettinger v. Stewart,
24 Cal. 2d 133, 148 P.2d 19 (1944); supra note 31.
35 ProssEa, TORTS 448 '(2d ed. 1955).
38Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 219 P.2d 73
(1950). Cf. Fisher v. General Petr. Corp., 123 Cal. App. 2d 770, 267 P.2d 841 (1954).
See RESTATEmENT, ToRTs § 342 (1934).
37 See Hickey v. Nulty, 182 Cal. App. 2d 237, 5 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1960), where the
court states that the employer must have actual knowledge of the risk. But the opinion
taken as a whole, and the citation of RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 413 (work which the em-
ployer "should" recognize as creating an unreasonable risk) indicate that the court
means actual knowledge of facts, or constructive knowledge of them, from which a,
reasonable man would conclude that a risk exists.
38 Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958); Snyder v. So.
Calif. Edison Co., 44 Cal. 2d 793, 285 P.2d 912 (1955); Knell v. Morris, 39 Cal. 2d
450, 247 P.2d 352 (1952); Brown v. George Pepperdine Foundation, 23 Cal. 2d 256,
143 P.2d 929 (1944); Lilienthal v. Hastings Clothing Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 343, 280
P.2d 824 (1955); Bazzoli v. Nance's Sanitarium, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 2d 232, 240 P.2d
672 (1952). See RESTATEMENT, TonTS §422 (1934).
39 See note 38 supra.
40 Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958).
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however, is broader, and it would seem to include the case where a
trespasser or licensee, whose presence is or should be known, is en-
dangered by the contractor's negligence in building or maintaining
structures on the employer's land, and the employer neither knows nor
should know of this negligence. In other words, in this situation it is
not necessary that the owner have knowledge of the risk to the tres-
passer or licensee.
Abutting Owner
The possessor of land must exercise reasonable care, with regard
to activities carried on, for the protection of those outside of his
premises.41 This section is concerned only with dangers to the adja-
cent highway. The occupier of abutting land is under a duty to use
reasonable care to see that the passage is safe.42 This duty extends
to any reasonable risk to persons on the. highway, such as an inade-
quately covered hole in the sidewalk, 43 an excavation next to the
street,44 or an obstruction on the sidewalk.45 The abutting owner is
not liable for injuries resulting from such conditions, when they are
created by his contractor, unless he knows or should know of the con-
ditions.4 If the condition is one which the owner has hired the con-
tractor to create, as an excavation in the street or on his land next to
the street, then the owner necessarily has knowledge of its existence,
and is liable for the negligent failure of the contractor to maintain
proper warning signals. 47 If the owner knows or should know of the
dangerous condition created by his contractor, then he is under a
non-delegable duty to exercise reasonable care to protect passers by
from injury.48
Duty Imposed by Public Authority
If the owner-employer undertakes to carry on an activity involving
possible danger to the public under a license or franchise granted by
41 Potter v. Empress Theatre Co., 91 Cal. App. 2d 4, 204 P.2d 120 (1949); 35 CAL.
JmR. 2d, Negligence, § 169 (1957). See PROSSER, TORTS 427-32 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS §§ 363-71 (1934).
42 Potter v. Empress Theatre Co., 91 Cal. App. 2d 4, 204 P.2d 120 (1949); Marton
v. Jones, 44 Cal. App. 299, 186 Pac. 410 (1919).
43 Frassi v. McDonald, 122 Cal. 400, 55 Pac. 139 (1898); Barry v. Ferkildsen, 72
Cal. 254, 13 Pac. 657 (1887).
44 Spence v. Schultz, 103 Cal. 208, 37 Pac. 220 (1894); Sawaya v. DeCou, 60 Cal.
App. 2d 146, 140 P.2d 98 (1943).
45 Wise v. Maxwell Hardware Co., 94 Cal. App. 765, 271 Pac. 918 (1928).
46 Frassi v. McDonald, 122 Cal. 400, 55 Pac. 139 (1898); Wise v. Maxwell Hard-
ware Co., 94 Cal. App. 765, 271 Pac. 918 (1928).
47 Spence v. Schultz, 103 Cal. 208, 37 Pac. 220 (1894); Sawaya v. DeCou, 60 Cal.
App. 2d 146, 140 P.2d 98 (1943); Robbins v. Hercules Gasoline Co., 80 Cal. App. 271,
251 Pac. 697 (1926). See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 417 (1934).
-1 Snyder v. So. Calif. Edison Co., 44 Cal. 2d 793, 285 P.2d 912 (1955); Knell v.
Morris, 39 Cal. 2d 450, 247 P.2d 352 (1952); Katz v. Helbing, 215 Cal. 449, 10 P.2d
1001 (1932); supra notes 46, 47.
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public authority, subject to liabilities or obligations imposed by the
authority, such liability may not be evaded by delegating performance
to an independent contractor. 49 Likewise, a duty imposed by statute,
where the activity involves possible danger to others, is non-delegable.o
The employer remains subject to liability for harm caused by the neg-
ligence of the contractor. 51 The rationale for holding the duty non-
delegable in the license and franchise cases seems to be that the activ-
ity which the employer is carrying on through his contractor would
be unlawful without the license or franchise. 52 Where the duty is
imposed by statute or ordinance, it would seem that the justification
for holding it non-delegable is that the statute or ordinance is directed
personally at the one who contracts to have the work done.53
Other Bases for Liability
The Nature of the Work
If the manner of performance, or the thing constructed, amounts
to a nuisance, and the owner knows or should know of its existence,
then the owner is liable for injuries resulting therefrom.54 Hence, if
the nuisance results from the contractor's negligent performance, it
must be shown that the owner either knew or should have known of
the existence of the nuisance. 55 If the mere non-negligent performance
of the work contracted for results in the creation of a nuisance, then
the owner is necessarily aware of its existence, as he formulated the
plan. The injury results from the fact that the work was done at all,
and it was the owner who caused it to be done.56
-9 Snyder v. So. Calif. Edison Co., 44 Cal. 2d 793, 285 P.2d 912 (1955); Eli v.
Murphy, 39 Cal. 2d 598, 248 P.2d 756 (1952); Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 17
Cal. 2d 594, 110 P.2d 1044 (1941); Bedford v. Bechtel Corp., 172 Cal. App. 2d 401,
342 P.2d 495 (1959); Lehman v. Robertson Truck - A - Way, 122 Cal. App. 2d 82, 264
P.2d 653 (1953); Gilbert v. Rogers, 117 Cal. App. 2d 712, 256 P.2d 574 (1953). See
RFsTATEMENT, Toats §§417, 428 (1934).
50 Luce v. Holloway, 156 Cal. 162, 103 Pac. 886 (1909); Spence v. Schultz, 103
Cal. 208, 37 Pac. 220 (1894); Bedford v. Bechtel Corp., 172 Cal. App. 2d 401, 342
P.2d 495 (1959); Atherley v. MacDonald, Young & Nelson, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 575,
298 P.2d 700 (1956); Sawaya v. DeCou, 60 Cal. App. 2d 146, 140 P.2d 98 (1943);
Bobbins v. Hercules Gasoline Co., 80 Cal. App. 271, 251 Pac. 697 (1926); Kirk v. Santa
Barbara Ice Co., 157 Cal. 591, 108 Pac. 509 (1910).
51 See note 50 supra.
52 Smith v. San Joaquin Light & Power Corp., 59 Cal. App. 647, 211 Pac. 843
(1922).
53 See Atherley v. MacDonald, Young & Nelson, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 575, 298
P.2d 700 (1956).
54 See notes 55, 56 infra.
55 Frassi v. McDonald, 122 Cal. 400, 55 Pac. 139 (1898); Wise v. Maxwell Hard-
ware Co., 94 Cal. App. 765, 271 Pac. 918 (1928); Wile v. Los Angeles Ice & Cold
Storage Co., 2 Cal. App. 190, 83 Pac. 971 (1905).
56 Snow v. Marian Realty Co., 212 Cal. 622, 299 Pac. 720 (1931); Louthan v.
Hewes, 138 Cal. 116, 70 Pac. 1065 (1902); Spence v. Schultz, 103 Cal. 208, 37 Pac.
220 (1894); Barry v. Terkildsen, 72 Cal. 254, 13 Pac. 657 (1887); Boswell v. Laird,
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A similar situation occurs where the performance of the contract
is in its nature necessarily injurious to a third party. Here too, the
injury does not result from the manner in which it is done, but from
the fact that it is done at all, and the owner is liable.5 7
Acts of the Employer
There are many cases where the injury may be attributed to the
negligence of the owner-employer, or the fact that he contracted for
the performance of work for which he would be held strictly liable
had he done it himself.
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which
involves a risk of bodily harm to others unless it is skillfully and care-
fully done is liable for the harm caused by a lack of reasonable care
in selecting the contractor.5 8 The employer must also use reasonable
care to provide for the necessary precautions which will alleviate the
foreseeable risk, either by contract or otherwise. 59 If the employer has
supplied the appliance to the contractor, he is liable for any injury
which a servant of the contractor may sustain by reason of a defect in
the appliances which was known to the employer or which he might
have discovered with the exercise of reasonable care at the time the
appliance or instrumentality was turned over to the contractor.60 He
is also liable for injuries to the contractor's servants caused by defec-
tive appliances when he has the privilege of selecting them or the
materials out of which they are made.6' This liability would un-
doubtedly extend to third persons other than the servants of the con-
tractor, as it is simply a case of the employer's negligence being the
proximate cause of the injury. Also, the employer has a duty to exer-
cise reasonable care in accepting the work after it is finished, and if
8 Cal. 469 (1857); Yee Chuck v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University,
179 Cal. App. 2d 405, 3 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1960); MacLean v. San Francisco, 127 Cal.
App. 2d 263, 273 P.2d 698 (1954).
57 Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1947); Williams v. Fresno
Canal & Irr. Co., 96 Cal. 629, 4 Pac. 669 (1884); Aston v. Nolan, 63 Cal. 269 (1883);
Gardner v. Stonestown Corp., 145 Cal. App. 2d 405, 302 P.2d 674 (1956); Atkinson v.
Charles Nelson Co., 41 Cal. App. 304, 182 Pac. 759 (1919); Hedstrom v. Union Trust
Co., 7 Cal. App. 278, 94 Pac. 386 (1908).
59 Courtell v. McEachen, 51 Cal. 2d 448, 334 P.2d 870 (1959); Risley v. Lenwell,
129 Cal. App. 2d 608, 277 P.2d 897 (1954); Skelton v. Fekete, 120 Cal. App. 2d 401,
261 P.2d 339 (1953). See RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 411 (1934).
59 Risley v. Lenwell, 129 Cal. App. 2d 608, 277 P.2d 897 (1954). See REsTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 413 (1934).
60 Williams v. Fairhaven Cemetery Ass'n, 52 Cal. 2d 135, 338 P.2d 392 (1959);
Moran v. Zenith Oil Co. 92 Cal. App. 2d 236, 206 P.2d 679 (1949); Bedford v. Bechtel
Corp., 172 Cal. App. 2d 401, 342 P.2d 495 (1959); Dickson v. So. Calif. Edison Co.,
136 Cal. App. 2d 85, 288 P.2d 310 (1955); Martin v. Food Machinery Corp., 100 Cal.
App. 2d 244, 223 P.2d 293 (1950).
61 Hard v. Hollywood Turf Club, 112 Cal. App. 2d 263, 246 P.2d 716 (1952);
supra note 60.
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he is negligent in so doing he is liable for subsequent injuries resulting
therefrom.62
Similarly, the employer may be held liable on the ground that he
would have been strictly liable had he himself done the work con-
tracted for.83 In such a case he cannot insulate himself from liability
by employing an independent contractor.6 4 This is similar to the in-
herent danger exception to the rule that there is no vicarious liability
imposed on the employer. But the latter exception is of broader scope,
imposing liability where the employer has done all that could be re-
quired of him,65 while the former is based on the employer's act of
securing the result.
When the employer interferes with or exercises control over the
contractor, his servants, or equipment, he may then be held liable for
resulting injuries.66 The injury may be viewed as a direct result of
the employer's interference or control. But it is more accurate to view
the exercise of control as creating a relation of master and servant,67
at least to the extent the control is exercised; and to hold the employer
liable for the acts of the servants on the basis of respondeat superior68
Conclusion
An attempt has been made to give a brief, general outline of the
various bases for holding liable the owner of land who employs an
independent contractor. It is apparent that more often than not he
will be held liable for injuries sustained by third persons. Liability
may attach under one of the exceptions to the so-called general rule-
a rule whose applications are outnumbered by its exceptions; it may
also attach because of the peculiar relationship of owner-employer in-
volved; or because the employer himself was negligent. Indeed, it is
becoming increasingly difficult for the owner of land to insulate him-
self from liability by hiring an independent contractor. But this is by
no means to be regretted; it is in consonance with the increasing
burdens which modem law is placing upon the owner of land.
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